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Abstract
An approximation of strategy-proofness in large, two-sided matching
markets is highly evident. Through simulations one can observe that the
percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size
grows. Furthermore, there seems to be a strong connection between the
length of preference order lists, the correlation of agent preferences, and
the approximation of strategy proofness. Interestingly, approximate strat-
egy proofness is reached easier with shorter length of preference orders and
higher preference correlation. These findings justify the use of deferred
acceptance algorithm in large two sided matching markets despite it not
being strategy-proof.
1 Introduction
Approximate strategy-proofness is
observed in large matching markets
where the percentage of agents who
can usefully deviate is small. A re-
search paper exploring this concept is
Roth and Elliot, 1990[1]. It presents
how the labor-market matching be-
tween newly graduated physicians and
hospitals benefit from the discovery
that ”Opportunities for strategic ma-
nipulations, are surprisingly small” i.e.
they show how approximate strategy-
proofness makes their matching algo-
rithm more robust in a large market.
Clearly, the implications of the prop-
erty could in many cases be important
when deciding how to implement large
matching markets. For example, by
giving market designers the opportu-
nity to trust the agents to report truth-
fully even though the DA mechanism is
not technically strategy-proof.
In this paper we are running mul-
tiple simulations to analyze how and
when one can approximate strategy-
proofness. Furthermore, we are aim-
ing at simulating different amounts of
correlation between the agents’ pref-
erences in the market. In researching
these properties we hope to get new in-
sights into when approximate strategy-
proofness can reliably mitigate gam-
ing of the system, and for what mar-
ket size, length of preference lists, and
preference correlation it appears effec-
tive to a lesser extent.
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Our hypothesis is that we will wit-
ness a near strategy-proofness for suf-
ficiently large markets and that the
length of the reported preference or-
dering and the amount of correlation
will have an effect on the approxima-
tion to strategy-proofness. All source
code can be found on the GitHub-
repo here.
2 Theory
Our study is based on several pieces
of existing research. The following is a
list of theorems with a description of
how they apply to our paper:
• Simplicity, Dynamic Stabil-
ity, and Robustness are some
of many wanted properties of
strategy-proofness (Lubin and
Parkes, 2012[2]) Thus, we want
to have a strategy-proof
mechanism design
• Theorem 12.5 Truthful report-
ing is a dominant strategy for
students in the student-proposing
DA mechanism. (Parkes and
Seuken, 2019[3])
• Theorem 12.7 No mechanism for
two-sided matching is both stable
and strategy-proof (Parkes and
Seuken, 2019[3])
Knowing that deferred accep-
tance returns a stable matching,
and that the proposing side has
truthful reporting as its dom-
inant strategy, we can deduce
that in general there exists use-
ful deviations, and that these will
only exits for the agents that are
being proposed to.
Thus, we only have to look
for deviations among agents
being proposed to.
• In simple markets, [...] all suc-
cessful manipulations can [also]
be accomplished by truncations
(Roth and Peranson, 1999[1])
This result is highly useful in
the implementation of our sim-
ulation. Instead of looking for
k! possible permutations of pref-
erences, for preference orders of
length k, it is sufficient to trun-
cate the preference order once
at every position for each par-
ticipant on the receiving side.
This makes an intractable prob-
lem tractable. Thus, we only
need to check for truncation
deviations.
The theorems mentioned
strategy-proofness desirable.
Furthermore, in the search
for approximated strategy-
proofness, we can conclude that
searching for deviations only in
the form of truncation on the re-
ceiving side of the market can be
done without loss of generality.
This reduces the computational
complexity immensely.
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Figure 1: Plots of the three probability distributions we used for modeling dif-
ferent levels of correlation between agents’ preferences. Left is the uncorrelated
distribution, middle is the moderate, and right is the high correlation.
3 Method
In short, our simulation generates
matching markets for a given amount
of preference correlation and length of
preference orders, gradually increasing
the market size, and for each market
size, counts the number of agents who
can usefully deviate.
Our algorithm can be divided into
three parts: (i) Preference Generation,
(ii) Deferred Acceptance, (iii) Count-
ing Deviations.
3.1 Preference Generation
For our results to be valid we need
to realistically model agent preferences
in a way that would resemble the dis-
tribution over preferences in a real
market. An important aspect we need
to capture is that some market partic-
ipants tend to be popular among all
agents on the other side, e.g. some men
are usually attractive in most women’s
eyes, which makes them more likely to
appear high on women’s hypothetical
preference orderings. We found that a
distribution defined by the inverse ex-
ponential function would give us a fit-
ting representation. We model three
specific market scenarios with differ-
ing level of correlation between agents’
preferences: (1) almost no correlation,
(2) moderate correlation, and (3) high
correlation. In figure 1, one can see a
plot of the three different distributions
used, respectively.
Based on these distributions we
first generated preference orderings for
one side of the market, where they
were given a k length preference list
drawn at random according to the dis-
tributions described above. Since it
e.g. does not makes sense for a hos-
pital to have preferences over students
they have not interviewed, we chose to
base the proposal-receiving side’s pref-
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erences on the preferences of the pro-
posers. This will also make sure we
have as high match ratio as possible.
We allowed the proposal receiving side
to have a variable length of preferences.
E.g. if every male was allowed to have
preference orderings of length 10, and
there are 5 males who have one specific
female among their preferences, that
female will have a preference ordering
of length 5. With everyone’s prefer-
ences in order we are ready to proceed
to the actual matching.
3.2 Deferred Acceptance
In order to find stable matches,
we implemented the deferred accep-
tance algorithm which is known to pro-
duce stable matches. This algorithm
takes incomplete preference orders and
interprets it as the agent preferring
to be unmatched to being matched
agents not on their list. E.g. suppose
m’s preference over f1, f2, f3 given as
f1 m f3. Then this will be inter-
preted as f1 m f3 m ∅ m f2.
The following is the pseudo code of
our deferred acceptance algorithm. We
had to implement this algorithm from
the bottom up, instead of using li-
braries, because most existing code did
not handle truncations and incomplete
preference orders.
Algorithm 1 DefferedAcceptance
Initialize p in proposers and r in recipients unmatched
while exists p that is unmatched and has someone yet to propose to do
for p in unmatched proposers do
r = most preferred r which p has not proposed yet
if p is not in r’s preference list then
break
else if r is unmatched then
(p, r) become matched
else
if r prefers p to current match then
(p, r) become matched
r’s previous match p’ becomes unmatched
else
no change
end if
end if
end for
end while
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3.3 Counting Deviations
This paper is trying to find a con-
nection between D(n), i.e. the number
of agents with useful deviations, and
n =, the number of agents on one side
of the market. Subsection 3.3 describes
the calculation of D(n).
As presented in section 2 Theory,
for the stable matchings produced by
a given mechanism, misreports in the
form of truncation deviation by the re-
ceiving side of the market is the only
possibility for useful deviations. For
simplicity, we call a recipient female
in this subsection (without intention
of being hetero-normative). When our
simulation returns a stable matching
based truthful reports (given a prefer-
ence generation dependent on ρ, k, and
n) we analyze this matching in the fol-
lowing way:
1. While there are females not ana-
lyzed, select a female.
2. Given a female, truncate her last
preference order entry.
3. Based on this new preference or-
der, run deferred acceptance and
check if this female benefits.
4. Repeat step 2 and 3 until devi-
ation is found (if so set D(n) =
D(n) + 1) or preference list is of
length one (in this case mark fe-
male as analysed and go to step
1).
We are counting how many fe-
males have at least one useful mis-
report. The D(n) returned will be
logged with the corresponding n =
market size, k = preference length and
ρ = preference correlation. Giving us
our final results.
4 Results
In this section we briefly present the results from our extensive simulations in
the form of a series of plots. This required 300+ CPU-hours.
Figure 2: Simulations for ρ = 0.05, 1.0, 3.0 (from left to right) each with k =
10, 15, 20, 40.
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Figure 3: Plot for 156 data points to the left and 2112 data points to the right.
With increasing data density, curves converge towards clearer separation.
Figure 4: Plot for ρ = 1.0 and for multiple values of k. Observe that longer
preference orderings tend to make the opportunities for strategic behavior larger.
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Figure 5: Plot for k = 20 for a range of different ρ. Observe that correlation
between agents’ preferences tend to increase the amount of opportunities for
strategic behavior.
Figure 6: Plot for k = 20, ρ = 1, for markets of size up to n = 1000. We assume
that other values for k and ρ will produce proportional results in the limit.
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5 Discussion
5.1 The General Findings
There are two main types of sim-
ulations performed. The first is
for four different preference lengths,
k = 10, 15, 20, 40, and three amounts
of preference correlations, ρ =
0.05, 1.0, 3.0, with a market size n,
running from 5 to 400 (figure 2). This
illustrates the effect of different k
and ρ on the approximate strategy-
proofness. The second type shows
how, as the market grows even larger
(up to n = 1000), D(n)/n converges
to 0 (figure 6). We show this while
keeping k and ρ constant at 20 and
1.0, respectively. Because we lack the
resources to run the same simulation
for the other values of k and ρ, we
chose k = 20 and ρ = 1.0 as repre-
sentative values. We assume that the
other curves would also tend towards
0.
As k and n grows, the amount of
computation required grows relatively
quickly. Our deferred acceptance im-
plementation has a running time of
O(n2). We run the DA for n recipients
with an average preference length k,
leaving our total simulation at an av-
erage running time of O(n3k). An un-
realistic, but definite worst case would
be O(n4), for k = n.
As a general finding, the results
show that the market quickly ap-
proaches strategy-proofness when the
markets grow from a size of n = 10 up
to around n = 100. In fact, in this seg-
ment of n, given a high ρ the percent-
age of agents with useful deviations
goes from around 16% to a mere 0.01%.
As the market grows even larger, the
percentage of agents with useful devia-
tions approaches zero, but the speed of
convergence slows down (see e.g. figure
5).
Our last figure shows how with
an increasing number of simulation
runs, the data plot gradually becomes
smoother with less random spikes in
D(n)/n. Since the generation of the
preference orders are partially based
on randomness, having the data based
on multiple simulations give us model
results gradually approaching an aver-
age value. The random based algo-
rithm design, makes our results more
easily applicable to the real world as
they are based on a huge set of dif-
ferent kind of matching market situ-
ations. The plot gradually converges
towards a monotone decreasing func-
tion. This leads us to conclude that
approximate strategy proofness gener-
ally exists in large markets. We can-
not, however, always rule out the exis-
tence of the odd possibility for devia-
tion for some agent.
5.2 Effect of Varying Preference-Order Length
In figure 2 we see how the three
plots: k = 10 in blue, k = 15 in or-
ange, and k = 20 in green. The im-
portant thing to note is that in general
the plots of D(n)/n for a given n in-
creases with k. Intuitively this makes
sense as a larger k quite simply gives
more preferences to truncate away, i.e.
more possible deviations. For a mar-
ket designer, the general advice would
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be that a smaller preference reporting
allowed restricts the amount of benefi-
cial misreports available for all agents
in total.
5.3 Effect of Varying the Preference Correlation
We note that an increasing correla-
tion, ρ (ρ=0.05, ρ=1 and ρ=3), leads
to smaller ratio of agents who can use-
fully deviate (D(n)/n). This allows
market designers with a knowledge of
low correlation to expand the market
to secure approximate strategy proof-
ness. As for the reason why stronger
correlation leads to less possibility for
useful deviation, having more agents
interested in the same matches makes
the rejection chain shorter, thus mak-
ing it unlikely to return to the deviator.
6 Applications and Improvements
As discussed, a matching market
designer has to choose between a stable
and a strategy proof matching. Parkes
and Seuken (2019[3]) argue that un-
stable markets have a tendency to un-
ravel (possibly with catastrophic con-
sequences) which makes stability an ar-
guably more important property than
strategy-proofness. However, as shown
in this paper, large market can gain
approximate strategy-proofness while
maintaining the stability of the out-
come.
In DA, the proposal-receiving side
gets their least preferred, achievable
match. In some cases it might actu-
ally be more important for organiz-
ing party to get the better matching.
An example could be a market try-
ing to match medical students to res-
idencies at hospitals. It is potentially
better if the hospital-optimal matching
was achieved instead of the student-
optimal one. This is because the needs
for students with specific talent and
knowledge at the hospitals might be
more important for the society at large
the individual wants of the students.
The results in this paper are likely
applicable to the real world. We have
seen that in two-sided matching mar-
kets it quickly becomes difficult to find
useful deviations for the receiving side.
This effect is particularly evident when
we have relatively short preference or-
derings and a high correlation between
the preferences of the agents in the
market. Both of these assumptions we
think are reasonable in real-world ap-
plications.
As a familiar instance, Norway has
a coordinated admissions system for al-
most every institution of higher edu-
cation, Samordna opptak. There, stu-
dents are ranked according to their
high school grades, and students are
allowed to create a strict preference or-
der over at most 10 schools. Here we
see that every agent on the propos-
ing side has a preference ordering of
length at most 10, while every recipient
has a preference ordering over all stu-
dents who have them on their prefer-
ence ordering. Furthermore, we know
from open statistics that a select few
schools are extremely popular, while
many schools are not as popular and
struggle to fill up their classes. This
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effect is probably common, and is well
captured by our medium or high cor-
relation distribution. These observa-
tions, together with the fact that the
market is very large (tens of thousand
of agents), make us believe that this
market would potentially reach strong
approximate strategy-proofness.
As a last point, we want to ar-
gue that even though our simulation is
implemented with an even-sized pool
of proposers and proposed agents, a
higher ρ models a matching market
with a different sized sides. When ρ is
large almost all proposed agents are in-
terested in a select few proposers. This
is close to a real world situation where
there are few proposers compared to
the proposed side. As such, an increas-
ing ρ could be used to model a situa-
tion with an increasingly large amount
of agents on the proposed side of the
market relative to the proposers.
7 Potential Issues and Next Steps
The following are some points of is-
sues and possible future implementa-
tions:
• Our simulation assumes an equal
number of proposer and recipi-
ents, and have not modeled the
case where there are more pro-
posers than recipients.
• If we were to use our code to
model more varied markets, we
would gain a lot from having
a more highly optimized algo-
rithm.
• We have modelled one-to-one
two sided matching market, but
there are many other form of
matching that might require
analysis. They include match-
ing with couples, one-to-many
matchings, and many-to-many
matchings. Next step would
be to expand our model to in-
clude these different matching
markets.
• This paper has given a empiri-
cal proof on the existence of ap-
proximate strategy proofness in
large two sided matching mar-
kets. The next step would be to
provide a theoretical proof as to
how and why this property arise
in large markets.
8 Conclusion
We have found approximate strategy-proofness to be prevalent in large mar-
kets. Our models show that the percentage of agents with useful deviations
decreases most rapidly between a market size of 10 and 100. Approximate
strategy-proofness decreases with the length of preference orders and increases
with preference correlation. Lastly, there are a number of real world applica-
tions, like the Norwegian university-application process, where these findings
are of interest. There still exists open issues that we could address in future
research.
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